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DOMESTIC LAW
I. INTERSPOUSAL WIRETAPPING SUBJECT TO FEDERAL STATUTE
In Pritchard v. Pritchard1 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals scrutinized the "interspousal electronic surveillance immu-
nity" doctrine.2 The court held that no express exception existed
for instances of wilful electronic surveillance between spouses
without consent under the federal wiretapping statute;3 nor did
any indication exist that Congress intended to imply an excep-
tion to facts involving interspousal wiretapping.4 In so holding,
the court adopted the majority rule applying the federal wire-
tapping statute to spousal wiretapping.5 Although a well-recog-
nized line of cases has articulated this application, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has chosen not to follow it.6
In this case the husband alleged that the wife violated the
wiretapping statute by wilfully intercepting and using his con-
versations by means of a hidden voice-activated tape recorder
1. 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
2. This phrase was coined by a commentator examining the federal wiretapping
statute's reach into the area of domestic relations. The immunity is similar to the older
interspousal tort immunity doctrine, but deals with the field of electronic surveillance.
The phrase, as used in this context, concerns only personal injury torts and is not to be
used in any other context (i.e., the evidentiary privilege to refuse to testify against one's
spouse or to prevent one's spouse from testifying). See Comment, Interspousal Elec-
tronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. TOL. REv. 185, 186 n. 7 (1975).
3. Title HI of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-20 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
4. 732 F.2d at 374.
5. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F.
Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (leading cases). See also United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978); White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974); Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F.
Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. IMI. 1982);
Citron v. Citron, 539 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gill v. Willer, 482 F. Supp. 776
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ricken-
baker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976); Connin v. Connin, 89 Misc.
2d 548, 392 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1976).
6. Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C. 350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981). For a discussion of
Baumrind, see Evidence, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REv. 145, 158
(1982).
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and other devices wired into the telephone in the marital home.
The United States District Court found that Congress did not
intend the wiretapping statute to reach the domestic area, that
the extension phone exemption s was evidence of this intent, and
that the statute would subject the wife to severe criminal liabil-
ity" if the husband prevailed in his civil action.10 Consequently,
the court dismissed the complaint. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals summarily reversed.
The Fourth Circuit examined three leading cases addressing
the federal wiretapping statute. The defendant had relied on
Simpson v. Simpson" for the proposition that the statute in-
cludes an implied exception when one spouse conducts a wiretap
of the conversations of the other spouse. 2 The plaintiff, on the
other hand, had cited United States v. Jones1 3 and Kratz v.
Kratz14 as authority that Title III prohibits all wiretapping ac-
tivities other than those expressly authorized. 15 After consider-
ing these cases, the court examined the language of the applica-
ble federal wiretapping statutes' 6 and concluded that "[i]n light
7. Record at 2. Brief of Appellant at 3.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(1976) states in part: "'[Electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice' means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral com-
munication other than (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, .... "
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) provides: "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter any person who ... [willfully violates this chapter] ... shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both."
10. Record at 10-11. The district court cited Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809
(5th Cir. 1974), for the proposition that "criminal statutes must be strictly construed, to
avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly proscribed."
11. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. 732 F.2d at 372.
13. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
14. 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
15. 732 F.2d at 372-73.
16. The statutes contains the following relevant provisions:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person
who-
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other per-
son to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral
communication in violation of this subsection; or
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
2
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of the clarity and lack of ambiguity of the statutory language, an
analysis of the legislative history would not appear to be neces-
sary.'1 7 Rather, the court chose to rely on prior decisions by
other courts that have undertaken independent legislative
analysis.'
The Fourth Circuit noted that the Simpson court itself ad-
mitted that its "search of legislative materials 'had been long,
exhaustive, and inconclusive.' '" The analyses conducted by the
Jones and Kratz courts, however, found that "the legislative his-
tory 'evince[d] a congressional awareness of the widespread use
of electronic eavesdropping in domestic relations cases, and a
congressional intent to prohibit such eavesdropping.'"20 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that "Title III prohibits all wiretap-
ping activities unless specifically excepted, 2 1 emphasizing that
"the language of the statute is not susceptible to the engrafting
of an interspousal exception.
'22
The Pritchard decision is not novel, but, rather, adopts a
both.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (c)(1976).
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against
any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to
intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover
from any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the
rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably in-
curred. A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall
constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this
chapter or under any other law.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. 1984). 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6)(1976) defines "person" as "any...
individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation ......
17. 732 F.2d at 373 (citing United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961), cited
in Jones, 542 F.2d at 667).
18. 732 F.2d at 373.
19. Id. (quoting Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806).
20. Id. at 373-74 (quoting Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 470). The court cited testimony by
Professor Robert Blakey, recognized as the author of Title I, and comments by Sena-
tors Long, Hruska, Dirksen, Scott, and Thurmond regarding the widespread use of elec-
tronic surveillance in the domestic relations area as persuasive authority that Congress
intended to thwart wiretapping in the domestic arena. Id. at 374 (citing Jones, 542 F.2d
at 669; Kratz,477 F. Supp. at 471).
21. 732 F.2d at 374.
22. Id. at 372.
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well-settled rule.23 It might have gone unnoticed, had the South
Carolina Supreme Court not taken the opposite view. 24 In
Baumrind v. Ewing,2 5 a case factually analogous to Pritchard,26
the supreme court acknowledged that the legislative history re-
flected a congressional intent that the Act embrace wiretapping
in the field of domestic affairs. Paradoxically, the court then
concluded that the tap performed by the husband was "beyond
the grasp of the statute. ' 27 The opinion is further confounded
because the supreme court chose to follow the Simpson line of
cases, 28 which found the legislative history inconclusive. It ap-
pears that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, as
well as that of the Simpson court, was based on nothing more
than a belief that domestic matters are traditionally matters of
state interest.29
The conflict between the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the South Carolina Supreme Court should alert the practi-
tioner that within the realm of interspousal wiretapping, parties
must tread lightly.
Anthony Todd Brown
II. DOWER RIGHTS ELIMINATED IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In Boan v. Watson30 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the state's common-law dower rights violated the equal
protection clauses of the South Carolina and United States Con-
23. See supra note 5.
24. Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C. 350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981). Interestingly, the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal wiretapping statute to prohibit
all interceptions of oral and wire communications except those specifically provided for
in the Act. These decisions, however, did not address the issue of interspousal wiretaps.
See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974); Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41, 46-52 (1972).
25. 276 S.C. 350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981).
26. The court in Baumrind distinguished Jones and Kratz, noting that the parties
in those cases were estranged. Pritchard, however, is not distinguishable on that basis.
27. 276 S.C. at 352, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
28. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Simpson,
490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974). It should be noted that the Simpson court harbored uncer-
tainties about its interpretation of the legislative history. "As should be obvious from the
foregoing, we are not without doubts about our decision." 490 F.2d at 810.
29. 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360; 490 F.2d at 805.
30. 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984).
[Vol. 37
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stitutions3 1 This important decision stated that wives whose
husbands died after May 23, 1984, would have no claim to dower
rights in South Carolina real estate.3 2 The holding will have a
significant impact on conveyancing and estate planning in South
Carolina and may prompt the enactment of legislation to com-
pensate for the lost right.
Boan died testate in 1976, having bequeathed 67 acres of
land in Chesterfield County, South Carolina, to his sister, Mrs.
Watson. Mrs. Boan, the widow, instituted an action to claim her
dower rights under South Carolina law33 and to place a lien on
the land for debts of the estate. The lower court ruled that Mrs.
Boan could recover money for the debts of the estate, but denied
the dower claim on the ground that dower violated the equal
protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.
3 4
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's conclusion that the South Carolina dower rights law was
unconstitutional.3 5 The supreme court reversed the lower court,
however, by holding that dower should be allowed in this case
because the widow had a vested interest in the land in question.
The court applied the decision prospectively to eliminate dower
rights for wives whose husbands died after the filing date of the
Boan opinion. 6
In reaching its conclusion, the court interpreted the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr37 to require that
South Carolina dower be held unconstitutional. In Orr the
Court held that an Alabama statute, which provided that hus-
bands, but not wives, could be required to pay alimony, violated
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
31. Id. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403.
32. Id.
33. As the court in Boan noted, dower, despite common misconception, was a com-
mon-law right, never actually codified. The legislature has, however, enacted statutes
affecting various aspects of dower, including renunciation of dower, forfeiture, barring
dower to mentally incompetent wives, acceptance of distributive share, and allotment of
dower. 281 S.C. at 518, 316 S.E.2d at 402 (citing S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 21-5-110 to -990
(1976)).
34. Record at 2.
35. 281 S.C. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403.
36. Id.
37. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
38. 281 S.C. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403.
1985]
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and that an alimony award to the wife could not be enforced.39
The South Carolina court's majority opinion reasoned that Orr,
which concerned the economic rights of husbands and wives in
the termination of marriage by divorce, was equally applicable
when the marriage was terminated by death. 0 The court noted
that the South Carolina General Assembly, in response to the
Orr decision, amended South Carolina's alimony statute41 to
provide for the granting of alimony to either spouse. The court
extended the Orr holding to require equal treatment in regard to
property rights, holding that the right of dower previously recog-
nized in this state was unconstitutional as violating the equal
protection clauses of the South Carolina 42 and United States
Constitutions. 43 In the instant case, however, where Mrs. Boan's
rights had vested three years prior to the Orr decision, the court
would not overturn title.44 The majority refused to apply the
elimination of dower retroactively to the date of the Orr decision
in 1979, holding instead that only widows whose husbands died
after the filing of the Boan decision would be barred from dower
claims.
45
Chief Justice Lewis' dissent rejected the interpretation that
Orr required the elimination of dower rights and limited Orr's
application to divorce litigation.46 He questioned the court's
need to involve itself in judicial legislation and suggested that
the social utility of the institution of dower had not been fully
analyzed. In contrast to the majority opinion's reliance on Orr,
39. 440 U.S. at 278-83.
40. 281 S.C. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 402-03.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-13 (1976).
42. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3 states in part: "The privileges and immunities of citizens
of this state and of the United States under this constitution shall not be abridged, .
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states in part "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
44. 281 S.C. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403 (citing Floyd v. Barrineau, 265 S.C. 16, 216
S.E.2d 753 (1975)(holding that vested property rights may not be overturned
retroactively)).
45. 281 S.C. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at 403.
46. Id. at 521, 316 S.E.2d at 404.
47. Chief Justice Lewis distinguished Orr from the instant case, noting that the Su-
preme Court abolished Orr's use of gender as a proxy for need. Probate courts, in con-
trast, "do not divide estates based upon the respective 'needs' of competing claimants.
Rights are settled by operation of law, the outcome being determined usually by prior
[Vol. 37
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the dissent analyzed dower rights under the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Kahn v Shevin.45 Kahn represents a
line of United States Supreme Court cases that have allowed
"benign discrimination" by statutes designed to balance affirma-
tively past discriminations based on gender.
49
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Kahn Court upheld a
Florida statute designed to give widows a $500 property tax ex-
emption. The statute's constitutionality was challenged by a
widower who argued that its gender based classification violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Court in Kahn stated that a
widow faced financial difficulties exceeding those faced by a
man. 50 This conclusion was based on statistics tending to show
that women were not compensated as well as men in the work
force.5 1 The Court validated the Florida statute because it was
"reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning
the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which the
loss impose[d] a disproportionate burden. '52 In his Boan dis-
sent, Chief Justice Lewis noted that Justice Blackman's concur-
ring opinion in Orr was based on the assumptions that Orr v.
Orr would not 'cut back on' Kahn v. Sherin. .... "53
The social policy underlying dower is no longer as compel-
ling as it once was. When common law first granted dower rights
to widows, husbands controlled their wives' persons and prop-
decisions of the decedent. Unlike an alimony case, there is no living wage-earner in an
estate probate from whom payments can be extracted based on earnings. Unless a testa-
tor has established a trust, there is usually no on-going resource upon which to draw. So
it is that if women are to be 'compensated' through the probate courts, there must be
some equivalent of dower for them. If an alternative to dower recommends itself as social
policy, the General Assembly in any case must attend that matter." Id. at 520-21, 316
S.E.2d at 403-04.
48. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
49. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)(upholding higher social secur-
ity benefits for women); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)(upholding sexual
distinctions in naval promotion scheme); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)(upholding
tax benefits for widows).
50. 416 U.S. at 353.
51. Id. at 353-54. "In 1970 while 40% of males in the work force earned over
$10,000, and 70% over $7,000, 45% of women working full time earned less than $5,000,
and 73.9% earned less than $7,000. U.S. Bureau of Census: Current Population Report,
Series P-60, No. 80." 416 U.S. at 353 n.4.
52. 416 U.S. at 355.
53. 281 S.C. at 521, 316 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Orr, 440 U.S. at 284).
19851
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erty. Modern women, however, enjoy the freedom of personal in-
dependence and ownership of property, and few widows need re-
sort to "working the land" to support themselves. In addition,
we no longer live in an agrarian society; a contemporary estate is
apt to consist of assets other than real estate so that dower
rights are often insignificant.
In weighing the equal protection mandates of Orr against
the "benign discrimination" affirmations of Kahn, one finds it to
be a close balance. As the Boan trial court order stated, however,
"[ilf, as may be desirable, a minimum inheritance, based on the
entire estate should be guaranteed the widow, the law should
accord a like benefit to the widower. '5 4 The dissent noted the
general dissatisfaction with the institution of dower, but pointed
out that in most states dower has been eliminated through stat-
utory change, after full consideration of the underlying social
policy and of the effects on the family unit.5
Boan v. Watson may have ramifications in several areas.
First, real estate conveyances after May 22, 1984, presumably
will not require a renunciation of dower. Second, the legislature
may feel compelled, as the dissent urged, to provide a statutory
remedy to replace dower rights. Finally, attorneys involved in
estate planning should caution clients that the elimination of
dower may necessitate revision of previously executed wills or
trusts to provide further protection for their spouses. Practition-
ers should also be aware that the Boan decision did not elimi-
nate the dower interest of wives whose husbands died on or
before May 22, 1984. Therefore, when searching title it will be
necessary to insure that dower rights of those widows were re-
nounced properly in prior conveyances.
The elimination of dower rights in Boan ensures that hus-
bands and wives have equal rights to hold personal interests in
real property and to alienate those interests without spousal
consent. This important decision has contributed to the process
54. Record at 11.
55. 281 S.C. at 521, 316 S.E.2d at 404.
[Vol. 37
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of removing legal impediments to equal property rights in South
Carolina.
Dorothy J. Hopko
III. HEARTBALM CAUSE OF ACTION REAFFIRMED
In Bradley v. Somers56 the South Carolina Supreme Court
refused to abolish or limit the tort cause of action for breach of
promise to marry. Writing for the court, Justice Harwell stated
that this cause of action will remain viable in South Carolina
until the legislature provides otherwise.5
As Justice Harwell noted, "The facts in this case weave a
web of tangled love affairs.""8 The plaintiff, Christine Bradley,
and the defendant, David Somers, were both married to other
parties when they met. The two began an affair in which they
dated, consummated their relationship sexually, and subse-
quently divorced their respective spouses in order to marry each
other. By May 11, 1982, both plaintiff and defendant had ob-
tained divorces; they planned to marry on June 20 of the same
year. In its opinion the court described in detail the numerous
preparations and substantial expenditures that were made in an-
ticipation of the wedding, which was to have been held at Hilton
Head Island.59 On the day of the ceremony, however, the defen-
dant balked when the time came to sign the marriage license,
explaining that "there [was] someone else." 60 Unable to recon-
56. 283 S.C. 365, 322 S.E.2d 665 (1984).
57. Id. at 368-69, 322 S.E.2d at 667. The court reasoned: "The appellant urges this
court to abolish the cause of action for breach of marriage promise. We decline to do so.
Most states which have abolished the cause of action have done so legislatively." See
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2D 553, 557 n.1 (1960).
58. 283 S.C. at 366, 322 S.E.2d at 665.
59. Id., 322 S.E.2d at 666. The court described the wedding preparations, which in
part justified the plaintiffi damages award, as follows:
In preparation for the wedding date of June 20, 1982, Captain Somers and
Christine ordered special wedding bands from the Smithsonian Institution.
They also arranged for the ceremony to take place in the First Presbyterian
Church in Hilton Head, to be performed by Dr. Kinchelowe, the church pastor.
The parties also engaged an organist, caterer, photographer, florist and baker.
In preparation for the wedding, Christine purchased a wedding dress, silk bou-
quet, shoes, and nightgown. She bought a Cross desk set as a gift for the groom
bearing the engraving "David W. Somers, Jr., June 20, 1982."
60. Id. at 367, 322 S.E.2d at 666.
1985]
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cile the bride and groom, the minister was forced to announce to
the waiting guests that the wedding had been cancelled.61
Bradley eventually filed suit against Somers alleging breach
of promise to marry. The plaintiff complained she "was humili-
ated, devastated, nauseated, and, shortly thereafter, suicidal." 2
At trial she offered evidence that she had been treated by a psy-
chiatrist and had incurred $3,000 in expenses for the treat-
ment.63 The trial judge refused to charge the jury that Bradley
was not entitled to damages for the dissolution of her first mar-
riage, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $60,000 in actual
damages.
e1
On appeal the supreme court reaffirmed the traditional
cause of action for breach of promise to marry, but reversed and
remanded the case on the grounds that the trial court's refusal
to make the curative charge resulted in prejudicial error.6 5 In
upholding the "heartbalm" action, the court deferred to the leg-
islature any decision to abolish it.66 The court recognized, how-
ever, the inequities inherent in allowing Bradley to recover dam-
ages for the dissolution of her first marriage.6 7 The court also
reasoned that Bradley could not sue on a promise made by the
defendant when she knew they were both legally married to
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. In addition to refusing to make the curative charge, the trial court also al-
lowed Bradley to testify that Somers had enticed her to leave her first husband and
thereby lose the financial security and social standing of that marriage. Bradley testified:
I would have had the companionship of a man I cared for. I would have had
the financial support of a husband .... The marriage with Frank could have
been saved ... had it not been for the intervention of David Somers and the
promise and prospect of a better life with him.
283 S.C. 367, 322 S.E.2d at 666. The supreme court found prejudicial error in the admis-
sion of this testimony as well as in the refusal to give the curative charge.
65. Id. at 368, 322 S.E.2d at 667.
66. See supra note 57.
67. The court drew an analogy to the situation in Hahn v. Bettingen, 81 Minn. 91,
83 N.W. 467 (1900), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court prevented a plaintiff from
recovering damages for the loss of a marriage that the plaintiff herself called off in order
to marry the defendant, who later breached his promise to marry. The Hahn court rea-
soned that to do otherwise would allow the plaintiff to profit from her own wrongdoing.
The Bradley court based its refusal to allow Bradley damages for the loss of her first
marriage on the Hahn rationale. To permit Bradley to recover such damages "would
reward her for her own wrongdoings." 283 S.C. at 368, 322 S.E.2d at 667.
[Vol. 37100
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other people."' Under Strickland v. Anderson69 such a promise
is considered void as against public policy, but the court ruled
that Bradley had established liability for "the breach of the re-
newed promise, made after the dissolution of the parties' earlier
marriages. ' 70 Suing on this later promise, Bradley was not enti-
tled to any damages arising from the dissolution of her first mar-
riage. She was, however, entitled to recover for the loss of pecu-
niary and social advantages of the promised marriage,
expenditures made in anticipation of the promised marriage,
mental distress, humiliation, and injury to health.71 Since the
trial court had failed to instruct the jury to disregard the finan-
cial and social position Bradley had enjoyed during her first
marriage, the supreme court remanded the case for a new trial
solely on the issue of damages.72
In Bradley the supreme court reaffirmed nearly two hun-
dred years of case law providing recovery for the breach of a
promise to marry.73 But as the court recognized, the legislatures
of a number of jurisdictions have abolished or significantly lim-
ited this cause of action. 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court's
deference to the legislature, however, was misplaced since the
action in South Carolina was created at common law.75 Passing
the responsibility to the legislature denied the court the oppor-
tunity at least to modify the cause of action and make it consis-
tent with contemporary views and modern domestic law.
The cause of action has its origin in the common law of sev-
enteenth century England.7 6 At that time marriage was consid-
ered largely a property transaction, and the traditional measure
68. 283 S.C. at 368, 322 S.E.2d at 667. In South Carolina, a promise of marriage
made while one is married to another is void as a matter of public policy. Strickland v.
Anderson, 186 S.C. 482, 196 S.E. 184 (1938).
69. Id.
70. 283 S.C. at 368 n.1, 322 S.E.2d at 667 n.1.
71. Id. at 368, 322 S.E.2d at 666. For a comprehensive discussion of the various
measures of damages employed by numerous jurisdictions, see Annot., 73 A.L.R.2D 553
(1960).
72. 283 S.C. at 369, 322 S.E.2d at 667.
73. The court expressly reaffirmed the vitality of the following cases: Strickland v.
Anderson, 186 S.C. 482, 196 S.E. 184 (1938); Coggins v. Cannon, 112 S.C. 225, 99 S.E. 823
(1919); Jones v. Fuller, 19 S.C. 66 (1882); Capehart v. Carodine, 4 Strob. 42 (1849); Evans
v. Terry, 1 Brev. 80 (1802).
74. See supra note 57.
75. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DomESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1968).
76. Id.
1985]
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of damages for breaching a promise to marry has reflected this
view." As the court in Bradley explained, a successful plaintiff
who sues for breach of promise to marry is entitled to recover
the loss of the financial and social standing he or she would have
enjoyed had the marriage taken place, in addition to the usual
types of tort damages, including recovery for injury to mind,
body, and reputation.7 8 In light of modern trends in domestic
law, such as no-fault divorce and rehabilitative alimony, it is no
wonder that the inequities created by preserving the traditional
cause of action for breach of promise to marry have encountered
what one court has termed "almost uniform criticism by
commentators.
7 9
One option available to the court in Bradley was to follow
the lead of the Washington Supreme Court, which modified the
cause of action to make the recoverable damages consistent with
contemporary tort and domestic law. In Stanard v. Bolin 0 the
Washington Supreme Court retained the cause of action, but
modified it so that a plaintiff can no longer "recover for loss of
expected financial and social position, because marriage is no
longer considered to be a property transaction.""' A plaintiff can
still recover foreseeable damages, which include costs incurred in
reliance on the marriage promise, as well as damages for im-
paired health, mental anguish, and harm to reputation.
2
Had the Bradley Court employed the logic of Stanard, the
77. Id. at 2.
78. See supra note 71.
79. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 618, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (1977). The court
explained:
In essence, these criticisms are: (1) the action is used as an instrument of op-
pression and blackmail; (2) engaged persons should be allowed to correct their
mistakes without fear of publicity and legal compulsion; (3) the action is sub-
ject to great abuse at the hands of gullible and sympathetic juries; (4) it is
wrong to allow under the guise of contract an action that is essentially tortious
and penal in nature; and (5) the measure of damages is unjust because dam-
ages are allowed for loss of social and economic position, whereas most persons
marry for reasons of mutual love and affection. See, e.g., 1 C. Vernier, Ameri-
can Family Laws 26-27 (1931); Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 474 (1929); Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10
Va. L. Rev. 361 (1924); White, Breach of Promise of Marriage, 10 L. Quar.
Rev. 135 (1894).
88 Wash. 2d at 618, 565 P.2d at 96.
80. 88 Wash. 2d 614, 565 P.2d. 94 (1977).
81. Id. at 622, 565 P.2d at 98.
82. Id. at 617-18, 565 P.2d at 96.
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cause of action for breach of promise to marry would have been
harmonized with the modern law of this state. In Washington a
suitor who breaches his or her promise to marry can expect to
incur liability similar to the liability possible in an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.83 The court in Stan-
ard considered such liability reasonable since it is foreseeable
that breaching one's promise to marry will result in the fiance
suffering emotional and physical harm.84 In South Carolina,
however, a suitor who decides not to go through with a proposed
marriage should be prepared to pay a high price since this state
will continue to impose liability on those who breach their
promises to marry.
David B. Summer, Jr.
IV. JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURT CLARIFIED
In White v. White85 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a family court that grants an annulment of a marriage con-
tinues to have jurisdiction to resolve all other related issues, in-
cluding claims for equitable distribution and attorney's fees. Al-
though it had previously been established that the family courts
had jurisdiction to determine these claims in a divorce, this deci-
sion makes it clear that complete jurisdiction extends to annul-
ment actions as well.
Richard Tony White brought this action for an annulment
of his marriage, alleging that at the time of his marriage his wife
was already married to another man.86 His wife then counter-
claimed for a divorce and requested distribution of the marital
property, alimony, and attorney's fees. 7 The family court dis-
missed the wife's counterclaim, granted the annulment, and
awarded the wife attorney's fees and the property of the mar-
83. The similarities between the complained of damages in Bradley and those al-
leged in a typical cause of action for the tort of outrage are readily apparent. See Ford v.
Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981). The disparity, however, in the amount and
kinds of damages available under the two theories seems inequitable.
84. 88 Wash.2d at 621, 565 P.2d at 98.
85. 283 S.C. 348, 323 S.E.2d 521 (1984).
86. Id. at 349, 323 S.E.2d at 522.
87. Id.
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riage. 85 Both parties agreed that the family court had exclusive
jurisdiction to grant the annulment,"9 but the husband appealed
on the basis that jurisdiction of the family court ended with the
annulment and did not extend to property distribution."
The supreme court stated that it was clearly the legislative
intent that family courts should consider and rule on all matters
pertaining to an annulment action.9' "Section 20-7-420 of the
South Carolina Code provides that the Family Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction:
(2) To hear and determine actions:
For divorce a vinculo matrimonii, separate support and main-
tenance, legal separation, and in other marital litigation be-
tween the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable
rights of the parties in such actions in and to the real and per-
sonal property of the marriage and attorney's fees ....
(6) To "to hear and determine actions for the annulment of
marriage.
(30) To make any order necessary to carry out and enforce the
provisions of this chapter .... ,,12
Reading these provisions together, the court concluded that the
family court had jurisdiction over all matters in this case. The
court further observed that this decision was consistent with an
earlier decision holding that jurisdiction for all domestic matters
vested in the family courts. 3
White v. White ends any confusion regarding the extent of
the family court's jurisdiction in annulment proceedings and in-
dicates that the statutory grant of jurisdiction will be inter-
preted broadly to permit the family courts to exercise jurisdic-
88. Record at 1.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(6)(1983 Supp.) states that the family courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction "to hear and determine actions for the annulment of marriage."
90. 283 S.C. at 349, 323 S.E.2d at 522.
91. Id. at 350, 323 S.E.2d at 522.
92. Id. at 349-50, 323 S.E.2d at 522 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(2), (6),
(30)(Supp. 1984)(emphasis supplied by the court)).
93. 283 S.C. at 350, 323 S.E.2d at 522 (citing Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 306
S.E.2d 624 (1983)). The court could have based its holding on the doctrine of equitable
clean-up since an annulment action is based on equity. This doctrine provides that
courts of equity may determine incidental questions in order to prevent a multiplicity of
legislation. Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939). Brief of Respondent at
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tion over all domestic matters.94
Judith L. McInnis
V. COMMON-LAW NECESSARIES DOCTRINE AFFIRMED AND
EXPANDED
In Richland Memorial Hospital v. Burton95 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the common-law necessaries doc-
trine96 allowed third parties providing necessaries to a husband
or wife to bring an action against the individual's spouse.97 This
decision is significant in affirming the validity of South Caro-
lina's common-law necessaries doctrine, while expanding the
doctrine to render a wife liable for a husband's debts necessary
for his support.
In this case Richland Memorial Hospital brought a collec-
tion action against defendant Burton, contending that under the
common-law necessaries doctrine and its codification in section
20-5-60 of the South Carolina Code,98 Burton was liable for hos-
pital debts incurred by his wife, then deceased. The trial court
held Burton liable under the common-law necessaries doctrine.
Burton appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing
that both the necessaries doctrine and section 20-5-60 were un-
constitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the
South Carolina9 9 and United States Constitutions.0 " The su-
94. The court's holding is consistent with prior decisions in related areas, although
no previous decision precisely addressed this issue. See, e.g., Newberry v. Newberry, 257
S.C. 202, 184 S.E.2d 704 (1971). This decision is also in harmony with an Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion stating that family courts have only the "jurisdiction which is expressly
conferred by statute or that which is incidentally necessary for the exercise of statutorily
conferred jurisdiction." 1980 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 48, No. 80-23.
95. 282 S.C. 159, 318 S.E.2d 12 (1984).
96. "The common law doctrine [of necessaries] as modified by statute therefore pro-
vides that, in the absence of contract, a husband is liable for his wife's necessaries sup-
plied to her by a third person." Id. at 160, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
97. Id. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
98. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-60 (1976) provides: "A husband shall not be liable for the
debts of his wife contracted prior to or after their marriage, except for her necessary
support and that of their minor children residing with her."
99. S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 3 provides: "The privileges and immunities of citizens of
this state and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor
shall any person be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
15
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preme court affirmed the trial court's decision and held Burton
liable under the common-law doctrine. The court did, however,
find that section 20-5-60 denied husbands equal protection. 10'
To obviate this constitutional defect, the court expanded the
common-law doctrine to impose liability on wives as well as hus-
bands for their spouses' necessary debts to third parties.
The court, examining the history of the common-law doc-
trine, observed that a wife's property was first declared separate
from her husband's in the Married Women's Property Acts dur-
ing the late 1870s. 10 2 The husband's duty to pay his wife's debts
was then codified in section 20-5-60 of the South Carolina
Code,10 3 but the liability was limited to those debts necessary for
her support. The court held that the common-law necessaries
doctrine "as codified in section 20-5-60 denies husbands equal
protection of the laws by failing to impose a reciprocal obliga-
tion on wives.' 0 4 In support of this finding, the court cited au-
thority from several other jurisdictions, 05 as well as Boan v.
Watson,"8 the recent South Carolina case abolishing common-
law dower. Rather than abolishing the common-law doctrine of
necessaries, however, the court remedied the constitutional de-
fect by extending the obligation to pay a spouse's debts to wives
as well as husbands. °7 In support of this expansion, the court
cited recent statutory amendments reflecting the legislature's in-
tent to impose familial support obligations equally on both hus-
100. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "nor [shall any state]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
101. 282 S.C. at 160-61, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
102. Id. at 160, 318 S.E.2d at 13. The Married Women's Property Acts are contained
in S.C. COD. ANN. §§ 20-5-10 to -80 (1976).
103. For text of § 20-5-60, see supra note 98.
104. 282 S.C. at 160-61, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
105. The court in Burton cited the following cases: Manatee Convalescent Center,
Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fl. Ct. App. 1980) (legislature's amendment to divorce
statute, imposing gender-neutral burden of support on both spouses, requires that wife
be liable for necessaries of husband); Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,
425 A.2d 1011 (1981)(common-law doctrine of necessaries and statute both invalid under
state equal rights amendment); Jersey Shore v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d
1003 (1980)(common-law necessaries doctrine, insulating wife from liability for hus-
band's expenses without according husband similar protection, constitutes denial of
equal protection); Schilling v. Bedford Memorial Hospital, 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905
(1983)(necessaries doctrine unconstitutional as creating a gender-based classification).
106. 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984). For a discussion of Boan, see supra text
accompanying notes 30-55.
107. 282 S.C. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13.
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bands and wives. 108 The court further noted that developments
in South Carolina case law also reflect an expansion of a wife's
common-law obligations. 109 Finally, the court noted the common
law's flexibility concerning interspousal rights and liabilities and
cited, as an example, a recent decision permitting wives to bring
actions for loss of consortium." 0
The legislative changes cited by the court in support of the
doctrine's expansion may indicate a desire by the legislature to
extend familial support obligations to both spouses, but legisla-
tive action has not clearly shown such an intent. Some statutes,
potentially subject to equal protection challenge,"' have not
been amended or repealed. Moreover, the cases cited by the
court in support of the expansion of the necessaries doctrine" 2
reveal only a tendancy toward implied extension. Since none of
the cited cases addressed a situation where the husband sought
to make the wife liable for child support, the court had never
before directly faced the question of expansion. Further, it is un-
clear why the Burton court chose to expand the necessaries doc-
trine rather than abolish it entirely, as the court had done in
Boan. Perhaps the court felt an obligation to assure that debts
to third parties would be paid. It would, however, have been
helpful if the court had established some guidelines for when it
would choose to expand, rather than abolish, doctrines and stat-
utes that violate equal protection.
The Burton decision leaves important issues still un-
resolved. As the court noted, "whether, in some instances, the
creditor must first seek to recover from the estate of the spouse
108. Id. The court cited the following statutes: S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (1976)(au-
thorizing courts to grant alimony pendente lite to either spouse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-
130 (1976)(authorizing courts to grant permanent alimony to either spouse); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-40 (1976)(authorizing courts to impose chid support obligations on either
spouse).
109. The court cited the following cases: Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171
(1961)(wife's earnings can be considered by court in assessing amount of husband's child
support obligations); Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237 (1942)(parents
with ability to do so have legal obligations to support legitimate minor children); Peebles
v. Disher, 279 S.C. 611, 310 S.E.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1983)(parents are not permitted to
execute irrevocable contract relieving either parent of duty to support a minor child).
110. Hiott v. Contracting Servs., 276 S.C. 632, 281 S.E.2d 224 (1981).
111. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-5-30 (1976)(a wife's property, acquired before
marriage or by gift or inheritance during marriage, is separate property not subject to
levy or sale on account of a husband's debts).
112. See cases cited supra note 109.
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who received the services"' 113 has not yet been decided. 114 Fur-
ther, the courts or the legislature must still consider whether
other sections of the Married Women's Property Act, such as
section 20-5-30, violate the equal protection clauses of the state
and federal constitutions.
Lisa S. Godwin
VI. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS UPHELD
Stork v. First National Bank of South Carolina"5 held that
antenuptial agreements will be enforced by the courts if they are
voluntary, fair, equitable, and made in good faith." 6 The South
Carolina Supreme Court found that such contracts are not con-
trary to public policy and are "highly beneficial to serving the
best interest of the marriage relationship.""
7
In Stork a widow brought an action for her dower rights in
the estate of her husband. The bank, as executor, argued that
the widow was barred from recovery because she had executed
an antenuptial agreement. In addition, the bank argued that the
right of dower is unconstitutional and violates the equal protec-
tion clauses of the United States and the South Carolina Consti-
tutions."' Mrs. Stork argued, however, that she had been
tricked into signing an antenuptial agreement that was unfair
and inequitable. Under the terms of the agreement she was ex-
cluded from her husband's estate.1 9 She contended that her sig-
nature on the agreement was obtained only minutes before she
was married and that she had been unable to read the contract
113. 282 S.C. at 161, 318 S.E.2d at 13-14.
114. Other jurisdictions have held that the primary liability rests with the spouse
incurring the debt. See, e.g., Jersey Shore v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003
(1980).
115. 281 S.C. 515, 316 S.E.2d 400 (1984).
116. Id. at 516, 316 S.E.2d at 401.
117. Id.
118. U.S, CoNsT. amend. XIV states in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." S. C. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides in part: "The privileges and immunities of citizens
of this State . . . shall not be abridged ... nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
119. Record at 1.
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or obtain counsel before signing the agreement.120 The bank in-
voked the Dead Man's Statute12" ' as a defense against the plain-
tiff's testimony. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the bank, upholding the antenuptial contract. The supreme
court affirmed on that issue, without addressing the constitu-
tional question.'22
In 1883 the South Carolina Supreme Court articulated a
standard in Shelton v. Shelton123 that has since been em-
ployed 124 to determine the validity of any contract to relinquish
dower rights. Under this standard such a contract "should be
entirely free from doubt, clear, positive and express in its
terms.' 25 In Bates v. Bates2 6 the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that whenever a husband or his estate acquires an
advantage from a property transaction with the wife, he must
"show the utmost fairness in the transaction and that the wife
was fully advised as to what she was doing and the effect of
it."' 2 7 After noting that Mrs. Bates had not received any inde-
pendent advice, legal or otherwise, prior to execution of the
deed, the court stated that independent legal advice, while not a
sine qua non of the validity of conveyances between wife and
husband, "is unquestionably a circumstance which, when it ex-
ists, militates for validity, and when it does not, as in this case,
its absence is of importance.' 1
28
120. Id. at 14.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (1976). This statute bars the testimony of one party
to an action to the extent that it affects some interest of that party, if the other party is
incompetent or deceased at the time of the action and the testimony concerns a litigated
transaction between the two parties. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-70 (1976), however, limits
the operation of § 19-11-20 by allowing a party to testify regarding fraud in the transac-
tion, provided the testimony is not on the party's own behalf.
122. 281 S.C. at 516, 316 S.E.2d at 401. In Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d
401 (1984), decided on the same day as Stork, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that dower rights were unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the
South Carolina and United States Constitutions. For a discussion of Boan, see supra
notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
123. 20 S.C. 560 (1883).
124. See, e.g., Harley v. Orvin, 197 S.C. 138, 143, 14 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1941); Tuten v.
Almeda Farms, 184 S.C. 195, 206, 192 S.E. 153, 158 (1937).
125. 20 S.C. at 566.
126. 213 S.C. 26, 48 S.E.2d 612 (1948).
127. Id. at 39, 48 S.E.2d at 618 (citing Way v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 S.C. 501,
39 S.E. 742 (1901) (assignment of insurance policy by wife to husband's estate held
void)).
128. 213 S.C. at 43, 48 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Way v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 461
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The cases cited in Stork entailed property conveyances or
dower renunciations executed after marriage, when strong obli-
gations and duties exist between spouses, and may, therefore, be
distinguishable from cases involving antenuptial agreements.
The wife in Stork, however, cited the general rule that for an
antenuptial agreement to be valid, some provision must be made
for the excluded spouse that counterbalances the waived prop-
erty rights. 129 The absence of such a provision requires a full and
frank disclosure of the assets the spouse is waiving.130 This re-
quirement of full disclosure parallels the requirement cited in
Bates. Indeed, the Stork court held that antenuptial agreements
are enforceable "if made voluntarily and in good faith and if fair
and equitable.' 13' The court apparently chose not to follow
Bates, which had shifted to the husband the burden of proving
the fairness of a transaction. 32 The wife in Stork alleged that
her businessman husband had, with assistance of counsel,
drafted the agreement to waive her dower rights and presented
it for her signature five minutes before the wedding ceremony.
Thus, because of the imminence of the wedding and the absence
of her eyeglasses, she was unable to read it.' 33 Both the trial
court and the supreme court, however, found the agreement en-
forceable. Under the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to
determine exactly what facts are required to render an antenup-
tial agreement fair, equitable, voluntary, and made in good faith.
This decision underscores how important it is that clients
receive counsel and be aware of their rights in making antenup-
tial agreements. While antenuptial agreements can be used to
limit claims to the spouse's property, they may also protect fu-
ture financial security. Stork is a significant decision because it
upheld the validity of an antenuptial agreement that was to take
effect upon the death of the spouse. Presumably, agreements
made to provide for property division or support upon divorce
would also be enforceable under the same standard, although
the opinion did not specifically address this issue. Antenuptial
S.C. 501, 39 S.E. 742 (1901)).
129. 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 97 (1944).
130. Id.
131. 281 S.C. at 516, 316 S.E.2d at 401.
132. 213 S.C. at 43, 48 S.E.2d at 619.
133. Record at 14.
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agreements will become more routine as courts, attorneys, and
individuals recognize these contracts as potential solutions to es-
tate planning and property settlement problems.
Dorothy J. Hopko
VII. No-FAULT SEPARATION PERIOD MAY INCLUDE INVOLUNTARY
MILITARY DUTY
In Niemann v. Niemann3 1 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that time spent out of the country on military duty
may count toward the twelve month separation period required
for a no-fault divorce in South Carolina. In this decision the
court adopted a rule previously recognized in other jurisdictions.
The parties in this case separated on May 8, 1980, and took
up separate residences. The husband, a naval officer, returned to
sea duty in July 1980.135 The wife was granted a divorce decree
on the statutory ground of continuous separation for a period of
one year, which included the time the husband was on sea
duty. 36 The husband appealed, claiming that the inclusion of
his time spent on involuntary military duty violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and was con-
trary to public policy. The court of appeals disagreed and af-
firmed the divorce decree.1
7
The court's rationale is clear. The Niemanns were separated
before Mr. Niemann returned to sea duty; the wife's intent to
sever the marital relationship clearly was manifested before the
husband's departure for military duty; thus, the separation was
independent of the military service. 38 Consequently, the seven
134. 282 S.C. 127, 317 S.E.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1984).
135. Id. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
136. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(5)(1976) provides that a divorce may be granted "fo]n
the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and
apart without cohabitation for a period of one year."
137. 282 S.C. at 128, 317 S.E.2d at 473.
138. Id., 317 S.E.2d at 473-74. The court's requirement that the separation itself be
independent of the involuntary separation also serves to prevent separations motivated
by nonmarital factors from ripening into "instant divorces" upon application by one
spouse. See, e.g., Hooker v. Hooker, 215 Va. 415, 417, 211 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1975). In Hooker
the court found that "as a prerequisite for a divorce [based on two year's separation]
there must be proof of an intention on the part of at least one of the parties to discon-
tinue permanently the marital cohabitation, followed by physical separation for the stat-
1985]
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months Mr. Niemann spent on sea duty was properly counted
toward the twelve-month separation period necessary for a no-
fault divorce in South Carolina. 3 ' By adopting this rule, the
court assumes a position consistent with that of other jurisdic-
tions which previously have addressed this issue.
140
The court noted that granting this divorce did not conflict
with the public policy of fostering and protecting marriage."4'
The statutory requirement of living separate and apart for one
year prior to commencing a divorce action insures that the sepa-
ration is not motivated by trivial considerations and affords the
parties an opportunity for reconciliation. 42 Section 20-3-10(5)
"was passed to implement a constitutional amendment favorably
approved by referendum.'
' 43
The court also held that application of the statute to per-
sons on involuntary military duty does not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court found
the contention of unconstitutionality "untenable because of our
holding that the separation must be independent of involuntary
sea duty."'44 The court did not specifically address appellant's
argument that servicemen are denied the full twelve-month pe-
riod for reconciliation that is afforded to civilians. 145 Rather, the
utory period... and that this intention is shown to have been present at the beginning
of the uninterrupted two year period. . . ." Here the court found no expressed intent of
the husband to separate prior to going overseas to work as a civilian military employee,
and, thus, held that his notification of such intent to his attorney two years later did not
meet the required two-year statutory period. This finding of express intent to separate is
required in order to put the spouse on notice and provide for reconciliation
opportunities.
139. 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
140. The court cited the following cases from other jurisdictions: Mogensky v.
Mogensky, 212 Ark. 28, 204 S.W.2d 782 (1947) (in which the parties' divorce was granted
because their separation occurred before the husband's induction into the army); Gard-
ner v. Gardner, 125 So. 2d 463 (La. Ct. App. 1960)(divorce was permissible when the
husband's military departure was independent and coincident of the parties' marital sep-
aration as defined by statute); Benson v. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316 (1949)(three-
year separation period required by statute for a divorce was not interrupted by the hus-
band's six-month service in the armed forces). 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
141. 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
142. See Noletti v. Noletti, 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963)(wife was not entitled
to commence a divorce action when husband deserted her for only one month and not
twelve months as required by statute). 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
143. 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
144. Id.
145. Brief of Appellant at 9.
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court emphasized that statutes are presumed to be constitution-
ally valid unless a clear showing to the contrary is made.14 6 Mr.
Niemann failed to make a showing that the no-fault divorce pro-
vision was unconstitutional.
147
Bonnie M. Weisman
VIII. BUSINESS ASSETS AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
A. Business Assets Must Be Considered in the Distribution
In Tucker v. Tucker148 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's equitable distribution of the marital
home because of its failure to consider business assets in making
an equitable distribution of the marital property and remanded
for redetermination the issue of equitable distribution as it re-
lates to the business and marital home.
149
This case came before the court on appeal from an order of
the family court that granted the appellant, Mrs. Tucker, a di-
vorce on the ground of adultery, denied her alimony,150 divided
the marital property, and awarded her attorney's fees.'5 ' The
central issue in this case concerned the division of business
property, specifically the failure of the trial court to consider as
marital property the assets represented by a private security
company founded by the husband in 1972, of which the husband
owned 85% of the stock and the wife owned none.
152
The court of appeals repeated its dictum in the recent case
146. 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474. See Floyd v. S.C. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 281 S.C. 483, 316 S.E.2d 143 (1984).
147. 282 S.C. at 129, 317 S.E.2d at 474.
148. 282 S.C. 261, 317 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1984).
149. Id. at 265, 317 S.E.2d at 765.
150. Id. at 262, 317 S.E.2d at 765. The court affirmed the denial of alimony, stating
that the trial court had not abused its discretion since it properly considered various
factors such as duration of the marriage and income of the parties, and particularly since
it awarded the wife exclusive possession of the marital home for three years and the
decree expressly reserved the wife's right to future alimony. Id. at 264, 317 S.E.2d at 765.
151. Id. at 262, 317 S.E.2d at 765. The trial court's award of $750 for attorney's fees
was reversed on appeal and remanded for specific findings of fact and redetermination.
The court of appeals based this decision upon the failure of the trial court to set attor-
ney's fees and upon its clear misinterpretation of counsel's affidavit. Id. at 267, 317
S.E.2d at 768.
152. Id. at 265, 317 S.E.2d at 767.
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of Reid v. Reid'53 that "'a spouse need not prove that he or she
made a material contribution toward the acquisition of particu-
lar property in order to be entitled to an equitable interest in
it.' ,,154 The facts of this case, however, like those in Reid,
demonstrate that Mrs. Tucker did contribute to the husband's
business by answering radio and telephone calls, typing and du-
plicating documents, preparing work reports, and running er-
rands, all without compensation. Further, Mrs. Tucker lent the
company $700, which remained unpaid.115 Citing the Reid dic-
tum and apparently deeming her entitled to receive an equitable
interest in the business because of her material contribution, the
court reversed the trial court's equitable distribution of the mar-
ital home for its failure to consider the business property.
The court of appeals also found error in the trial court's
holding that the business had "no appreciable market value
since it depends entirely upon [the husband's] own skill and
good health for its operation."' 56 The court stressed that the
trial court must determine the market value of the corporate
property as an established and continuing business, considering
"its 'net asset value, the fair market value of its stock, and its
earnings or investment value.' ,,157
The court of appeals remanded the case and directed that
"the trial court, in addition to determining whether the wife
[was] entitled to an equitable interest in the husband's business
and, if so, the amount of that interest, [should] determine the
value of the business property and of the husband's interest
therein and [should] decide upon the method by which to dis-
tribute to the wife or to compensate her for any interest it deter-
mines the wife should have in the business property.'
' 58
153. 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984).
154. 282 S.C. at 265, 317 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting Reid, 280 S.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at
729). This language seems to contradict an earlier case, Baker v. Baker, 276 S.C. 427, 279
S.E.2d 601 (1981), in which the court stated that "[ihe right of a wife to claim a special
equitable interest in property accumulated during marriage is based upon her showing
that she has materially contributed through finances or personal services to the hus-
band's business or acquisition of property" and that "this special equity should be war-
ranted only where there exist special facts and circumstances in favor of one party above
and beyond the normal marital obligations." Id. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
155. 282 S.C. at 265, 317 S.E.2d at 767.
156. Id. at 266, 317 S.E.2d at 767.
157. Id. (quoting Reid, 280 S.C. at 373, 312 S.E.2d at 727).
158. 282 S.C. at 266, 317 S.E.2d at 767. The court cited Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C.
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In conclusion, Tucker considered the issue of material con-
tribution as it affects equitable interest. Although listing ways in
which Mrs. Tucker had contributed to her husband's business,
the court nonetheless repeated language from Reid stating that a
spouse need not have contributed materially toward the acquisi-
tion of particular property to be entitled to an equitable interest
therein. Reid and Tucker, therefore, seem to mark a departure
from the Baker v. Baker159 holding that "special" material con-
tributions must be shown before a wife can claim an equitable
interest in her husband's property.16 0 Nevertheless, since Reid
and Tucker both discuss actual contributions by the wives, it
would be prudent for South Carolina practitioners to demon-
strate such contributions whenever possible; practitioners should
rely on the dictum that material contributions are not necessary
only if the client made no contributions.
B. Valuation of Business Assets
In Reid v. Reid16 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the valuation of property for dividing marital assets must
be supported by evidence in the record if it is to withstand re-
view. 1 62 The court stressed that "[iun any equitable distribution
of marital assets, the family court not only must identify the
property that constitutes the marital estate, but must also deter-
mine the fair market value of the particular property."1 63
The major issue was the trial judge's consideration of Reid
Office Supply's assets in the division of the marital estate after
418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1984), apparently adopting the three-step procedure estab-
lished there for dividing marital property. Id. at 424, 312 S.E.2d at 271 (citations omit-
ted). For a discussion of Hussey, see infra text accompanying notes 228-49. The Hussey
test was promulgated for consideration of the husband's inherited property, but Tucker
demonstrated that this three-part procedure is not limited to that situation.
159. 276 S.C. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
160. The Baker requirement of "special" contributions had been further eroded,
however, in Parrott v. Parrott, 278 S.C. 60, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982). In Parrott, the su-
preme court recognized a new exception to the "title theory" of property division upon
divorce, holding that a spouse may be entitled to equitable division of property for
homemaker services rendered during a long marriage, when the homemaker spouse has
foregone career opportunities. Id. at 63, 292 S.E.2d at 184. Prior to Parrott only two
exceptions had been recognized: resulting trust and special equity.
161. 280 S.C. 367, 312 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1984).
162. Id. at 372, 312 S.E.2d at 727.
163. Id.
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preserving the husband's virtually complete ownership of the
company.16 4 The court stated, as dictum, that a spouse need not
prove that he or she made a material contribution toward the
acquisition of particular property in order to be entitled to as-
sert an equitable interest therein.16 5 This dictum is in accord
with the recent case of Parrott v. Parrott,6 in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that when a spouse has foregone
career opportunities to provide homemaking services to the fam-
ily, the spouse "shall have upon divorce an equitable interest in
real property acquired by the wage-earner spouse during the
marriage.' 1 67 Reid and Parrott appear to contradict the prior de-
cision in Baker v. Baker,' which stated that "[tihe right of a
wife to claim a special equitable interest in property accumu-
lated during marriage is based upon her showing that she has
materially contributed through finances or personal services to
the husband's business or acquisition of property" and that
"this 'special equitable interest' shall be warranted only where
there exist special facts and circumstances in favor of one party
above and beyond the normal marital obligations."1 69 Finding
that Mrs. Reid had aided in the growth and enhanced the value
of the company, °7 0 the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge
to the extent that he considered the business assets in appor-
tioning the marital property.'
7 '
In discussing the proper valuation of the business, the court
reaffirmed prior South Carolina case law by stating that "[w]hen
valuing business interests for the purpose of equitable distribu-
tion, the family court should determine 'the fair market value of
the corporate property as an established and going business'...
'by considering the business' net asset value, the fair market
164. Id. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 729. The husband owned all but one share of the
company's stock; the wife owned the remaining share. Id.
165. Id.
166. 278 S.C. 60, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
167. Id. at 63, 292 S.E.2d at 184.
168. 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601 (1981).
169. Id. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
170. 280 S.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 729. She provided secretarial and bookkeeping
services to the company, entertained customers, attended business meetings and conven-
tions, took part in civic activities, and assisted with the installation of a computer system
to aid the company. At no time, however, did she ever receive a salary.
171. Id. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 729.
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value for its stock, and earnings or investment value.' ,,172 The
court remanded this issue for further determination, holding
that the trial judge's valuation of Reid Office Supply lacked evi-
dence to support it and was incorrectly based upon the book or
depreciated value of the fixed assets, rather than upon their fair
market value.""5
In reviewing the trial judge's valuation of nonbusiness real
property, the court clarified prior law regarding the the admissi-
bility of an offer to sell property as evidence of value. The court
stated that although a bona fide offer to sell land at a certain
price does not usually establish the land's value, a bona fide of-
fer to sell at a given price, if in the nature of an admission, may
indeed constitute evidence of value as against the owner. 7
4
Thus, the court held that the appellant's offer to sell the land at
$3000 per acre was a bona fide offer in the nature of an admis-
sion and upheld the trial judge's valuation of the land at $2700
per acre.
175
The court also reviewed the trial judge's equal distribution
of property purchased in part with money inherited by the hus-
band.176 Following the dictates of the recent case of Hussey v.
Hussey,'" the court remanded this issue to the trial court to de-
172. Id. at 373, 312 S.E.2d at 727 (quoting Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 274,
217 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1975); Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property
Rights Upon Divorce in South Carolina: An Exploration and Recommendation, 33
S.C.L. REv. 227, 246 (1981)). The court defined "fair market value" as "the amount of
money which a purchaser willing but not obligated to buy the property would pay an
owner willing but not obligated to sell it, taking into account all uses to which the prop-
erty is adapted and might in reason be applied." 280 S.C. at 373, 312 S.E.2d at 727.
173. 280 S.C. at 343, 312 S.E.2d at 727.
174. Id. at 374, 312 S.E.2d at 728 (citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 182(3)(1964); Hum-
ble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1969)). The Humble Oil
court stressed that offers to sell "are admissible against the owner but not, as in this
case, in favor of the owner, as evidence of value." 297 F. Supp. at 655.
175. 280 S.C. at 374, 312 S.E.2d at 728. The court distinguished the owner's testi-
mony that he would not sell a houseboat for less than a certain amount, stating that such
testimony does not constitute a bona fide offer to sell. Thus, such statements may not be
considered as admissions of an asset's value. Id. at 374-75, 312 S.E.2d at 728.
176. Id. at 375-76, 312 S.E.2d at 728-29.
177. 280 S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1984) (inherited property is generally not
a marital asset, but this nomnarital character may be lost if the property "becomes so
commingled as to be untraceable; is utilized by the parties in support of the marriage; or
is titled jointly or otherwise utilized in such manner as to evidence an intent by the
parties to make it marital property.") For a discussion of Hussey, see infra text accom-
panying notes 228-49.
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termine whether the inherited funds in question were used to
acquire property and, if so, whether the inherited funds retained
their nonmarital character. 1""
The court also discussed the criteria that a family court
should consider in determining whether to order a divorced par-
ent to assist a child over eighteen years of age with educational
expenses. The court reaffirmed Risinger v. Risinger,17 1 which
enumerated four criteria to be employed in this determina-
tion.18o The Reid court remanded this issue "for findings of fact
as to whether the daughter would benefit from a college educa-
tion and as to whether she could attend college without her fa-
ther's support."181 The court thus demonstrated that mere con-
sideration of the child's ability to do well and the parent's
financial ability to help pay for such education is not sufficient;
rather, the court suggested that all four criteria must be
addressed.1
8 2
The final issue in this appeal concerned the husband's as-
sertion that the award of attorney's fees was improper because
the wife was not in financial need and because the court ordered
that the fees be paid directly to the wife's attorney. The court
stated that an award of attorney's fees is unrelated to the ability
of the wife to pay them. 83 Citing Louthian and Merritt, P.A. v.
Davis,18 4 the court found that the trial court had committed er-
178. 280 S.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 729.
179. 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
180. In Risinger the court of appeals enumerated the following criteria:
(1) the characteristics of the child indicate that he or she will benefit from
college; (2) the child demonstrates the ability to do well, or at least make satis-
factory grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go to school; and (4) the parent
has the financial ability to help pay for such an education.
Id. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653-54.
181. 280 S.C. at 372, 312 S.E.2d at 726.
182. Id. at 371-72, 312 S.E.2d at 726.
183. Id. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 191, 209
S.E.2d 42, 45 (1974)).
184. 272 S.C. 330, 251 S.E.2d 757 (1979). Expressly overruling Darden v. Witham,
263 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974), the Louthian court stated that a claim for attorney's
fees is purely personal and, therefore, they must be paid directly to the litigant. The
legislature subsequently enacted § 20-3-145 of the South Carolina Code, in an apparent
attempt to offset the effect of Louthian and ensure that attorneys are paid. See Domes-
tic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REV. 105, 112 (1980).
Section 20-3-145 provides:
In any divorce action any attorney fee awarded by the court shall consti-
tute a lien on any property owned by the person ordered to pay the attorney
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ror in awarding attorney's fees directly to the wife's attorney.
The court went on, however, to find that this was not reversible
error because no prejudice to the husband had been shown.85
The court thus suggested that only a showing of actual prejudice
will trigger the rule of Louthian disallowing an award of attor-
ney's fees directly to the attorney.
Reid significantly clarified several recent South Carolina do-
mestic law decisions. The decision followed prior case law in
finding that contribution by a wife toward the acquisition of
specific property is not a prerequisite to the assertion of an equi-
table interest in the property. This case also demonstrated the
need for practitioners to present evidence of the fair market
value of property in a divorce proceeding. Furthermore, the
opinion repeated the Hussey holding that before inherited prop-
erty can be distributed, the noninheriting spouse must show that
it has lost its nonmarital character. Reid also demonstrated that
each of the four criteria cited in Risinger must be considered in
determining whether to order a parent to pay college expenses
for a child. Finally, Reid reconciles seemingly divergent law re-
garding attorney's fees by indicating that prejudice to the com-
plaining party must be shown to necessitate reversal based on
the award of attorney's fees directly to the attorney.
Mary Woodson Poag
IX. OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF GUARDIAN AD
LITEM REQUIRED IN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
As the United States Supreme Court directed, "In almost
every setting where important decisions turn on questions of
fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses."' The South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals, in Collins v. Collins,17 faced a novel due process issue:
fee and such attorney fee shall be paid to the estate of the person entitled to
receive it under the order if such person dies during the pending of the divorce
action.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-145 (1976).
185. This finding may have been an attempt to reconcile the divergent views dis-
cussed supra note 184.
186. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)(citations omitted).
187. 283 S.C. 526, 324 S.E.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1984).
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"whether a party to a child custody proceeding has the right to
cross-examine the guardian ad litem whose report the court con-
siders in its decision on custody . . 188 The court held that
"where the report contains statements of fact, the litigants are
entitled to cross-examine the guardian ad litem and any wit-
nesses whose testimony formed the basis of the guardian's rec-
ommendation."18' The court further concluded that a litigant in
a child custody proceeding has a right to a copy of the guard-
ian's report, including the recommendation for custody of the
child.190 Finally, the court stated that the family court judge's
failure to make the report available to the litigants or to permit
proper cross-examination was reversible error unless the liti-
gants had waived their right to cross-examination or, under the
circumstances, the denial of the right was harmless error.19'
With this decision, South Carolina joins the majority of jurisdic-
tions, which allow cross-examination in child custody
proceedings.
9 2
In Collins the husband initiated a custody action after his
wife and child moved out of the marital residence. The wife
counterclaimed, inter alia,19 3 for custody of the seven-year-old
daughter. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child.
The wife then filed a supplemental answer counterclaiming for a
divorce, which was granted. The husband, however, was awarded
custody of the child.
19 4
188. Id. at 529, 324 S.E.2d at 84.
189. Id. at 530, 324 S.E.2d at 85.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 437 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1968); In re George G., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977); In re A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982); Aylor v.
Aylor, 173 Colo. 294, 478 P.2d 302 (1970); Moody v. Gilbert, 208 Ga. 784, 69 S.E.2d 874
(1952); Sabol v. Sabol, 624 P.2d 1379 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981); Yearsley v. Yearsley, 94
Idaho 667, 496 P.2d 666 (1972); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291
(1955); Krebs v. Krebs, 83 A.D.2d 989, 443 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1981); Malone v. Malone, 591
P.2d 296 (Okla. 1979); Kates v. Smith, 556 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). See gener-
ally Comment, The "Adversary" Process in Child Custody Proceedings, 18 CASE W. RES.
1731 (1967); Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. CHL L.
Rav. 349 (1957); Annot., 59 A.L.L3n 1337 (1974); Annot., 35 A.LR.2D 629 (1954).
193. Although Ms. Collins also counterclaimed for alimony, child support, attorney's
fees, and an equitable division of the marital property, the order denied her request for
alimony and attorney's fees. 283 S.C. at 527-28, 324 S.E.2d at 83.
194. Id.
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On appeal the wife's primary contention 95 was that the
family court's in camera receipt of the guardian ad litem's rec-
ommendation denied her due process of law.196 The court of ap-
peals implicitly agreed, reasoning that the ends of justice are
better served by permitting cross-examination of a guardian ad
litem.197 The court concluded, however, that upon the facts of
this case, the in camera receipt of the guardian's report was
harmless error.198 The court stated that based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the husband should have been awarded
custody of the child, even without the guardian ad litem's re-
port. e1 9 Consequently, the family court's order regarding custody
was affirmed. 00
Although the court ostensibly agreed with Ms. Collins' due
process argument, the opinion did not address the specifics of
her contention. The report, considered by the family court in
reaching its decision, clearly recommended that the husband be
given custody of the child. 10' Moreover, both parties conceded in
oral argument that the report was not introduced in court and
195. She also contended that (1) the award of custody was against the weight of the
evidence; (2) the fee awarded the guardian was excessive; (3) the denial of alimony and
*attorney's fees was not supported by the evidence and amounted to an abuse of discre-
tion; and (4) the equitable distribution of less than one-half of the marital home to her
was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 528, 324 S.E.2d at 83-84.
196. There is no evidence in the record of any findings by the guardian ad litem
other than the recommendation that custody be awarded to the father. Id. at 529, 324
S.E.2d at 84.
197. Id. at 530, 324 S.E.2d at 85. The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions
hold that "the litigants are entitled to know and have an opportunity to rebut the fac-
tual bases upon which the guardian or investigator makes his recommendation." Id.
198. Id. at 530, 324 S.E.2d at 85.
199. Id. Apparently the trial court's preponderance of the evidence consisted of the
following: (1) the young wife's primary present interests were her social and career en-
deavors; (2) her jobs as disc jockey and dance instructor frequently caused her to be
away from home at night; (3) the child had been left with different persons on occasion,
sometimes overnight and without the prior approval of the person keeping the child; (4)
the husband, on the other hand, was at home at night; (5) he was a settled and mature
person; (6) he possessed strong moral values; and (7) he spent time with the child and
was willing to accept the responsibility of her upbringing. The court of appeals did, how-
ever, state that it was not "detailing all the evidence." Based upon this review of the
evidence, the court unhesitantly accepted the lower court's findings, citing the universal
rule that great deference must be given the trial judge, who is in a better position to
observe the witnesses and to judge their demeanor and veracity. Id. at 528-29, 324 S.E.2d
at 84.
200. The case was remanded solely for a redetermination of the guardian's fee of
$638. Id. at 528, 324 S.E.2d at 85.
201. Id. at 529, 324 S.E.2d at 84.
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that they were aware neither of its existence nor of its filing with
the court.2 2 Ms. Collins, therefore, was not afforded an opportu-
nity to rebut through cross-examination any of the factual find-
ings contained in the report. As a result, she was deprived of the
custodial rights she had previously enjoyed.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a defini-
tion of harmless error: "The question is whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the [decision]. 203 Since there is clearly a reasona-
ble possibility that the guardian ad litem's report influenced the
trial judge, the denial of the report to Ms. Collins did not
amount to harmless error under this standard.
In a similar situation the Illinois Court of Appeals emphati-
cally stated that "the use of outside investigations and confiden-
tial reports contravenes the American ideal of due process of
law" and constitutes reversible error.0 4 In fact, a majority of
states have held that a court's custody order should rest upon
evidence presented in open court in observance of due process
requirements.0 5 One commentator summarized this rule as fol-
lows: "Judicial consideration of. . . reports which have not been
admitted in evidence or otherwise disclosed to the parties is uni-
versally held erroneous, reflecting the general rule that on fac-
tual questions not subject to judicial notice a tribunal may not
consider material which is unknown to the parties.) 20 6
In Malone u. Malone0 7 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma de-
clared, "There is no back door to the courts for witnesses, inves-
tigators, or litigants." 208 The court explained, "An investigator
stands in no better position than an ordinary witness, and must
be available for complete cross-examination on any matter
202. Id.
203. Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (citing Fahy v. State of
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
204. Williams v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 7, 130 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955). Accord,
Walter v. Walter, 61 Ill. App. 2d 476, 209 N.E.2d 691 (1965); Malone v. Malone, 591 P.2d
296, 299 (Okla. 1979).
205. Malone v. Malone, 591 P.2d 296, 297 (Okla. 1979); see also Annot., 35 A.L.R.2D
612 (1954).
206. Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. CHi. L.
R.v. 349, 352 nn. 17 & 18 (1957).
207. 591 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1979). This was also a case of first impression.
208. 591 P.2d at 298 (citing Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ariz. App. 352, 427 P.2d 156
(1967); Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 590, 122 P.2d 96, 101 (1942)).
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which he may report to the judge. ' 20 9 Logic and fairness dictate
that the litigants have the opportunity to cross-examine the
guardian on any matter contained in the report since no method
exists for determining the report's influence on the family court
judge. Thus, if the ends of justice are truly to be served, a liti-
gant should be afforded the opportunity to "test the credibility
of the investigator through cross-examination and confrontation,
and to meet or answer every adverse fact or inference included
[in the report]."2 10 This right should exist whenever a custody
report is filed with the family court. Due process requires that a
litigant be granted the opportunity to challenge, explain, and re-
but the factual materials a court uses to reach its decision.211
Clearly, Ms. Collins was denied this opportunity.
Anthony Todd Brown
X. BODILY INJURY NOT REQUIRED FOR FINDING OF "PHYSICAL
CRUELTY"
In Gibson v. Gibson21 2 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that it was not necessary for a spouse to prove actual bodily
injury in a divorce action based on physical cruelty if (1) the act
of violence actually endangered the spouse's life, or (2) the act
manifested an intention to cause serious bodily harm, or (3) the
act raised a reasonable apprehension of future bodily harm. This
decision established a new interpretation of physical cruelty to
be applied in South Carolina domestic law.
The Gibsons were married in 1958. In June 1981, following
an argument that ended with the husband requesting a divorce,
the wife moved out of the marital home. She returned several
days later "in a heavily intoxicated condition. 2 13 After arguing
with her husband, the wife went into the bedroom, locked the
209. 591 P.2d at 298. See also Sabol v. Sabol, 624 P.2d 1378 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981).
210. 591 P.2d at 299. The Malone court encouraged the use of custody reports, but
warned that care should be taken to give fair notice of their content to the parties in the
action. Id.
211. Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. CHL L.
REv. 349, 352 nn. 17 & 18 (1957). See also Comment, The "Adversary" Process in Child
Custody Proceedings, 18 CASE W. REs. 1731 (1967).
212. 283 S.C. 318, 322 S.E.2d 680 (Ct. App. 1984).
213. Id. at 322, 322 S.E.2d at 682.
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door, and shot through the door sixteen times with a .22 caliber
rifle. The husband claimed he was struck on his face by a small
splinter when the wife fired the first shot. The wife claimed the
husband was not outside the door when she began shooting. 14
The wife brought an action for separate maintenance, equitable
distribution, and attorney's fees. The husband counterclaimed
and requested a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty. The
family court granted the wife separate maintenance and denied
the husband a divorce.215 The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded to family court.
216
The court of appeals found that physical cruelty had been
judicially defined as "'actual personal violence, or such a course
of physical treatment as endangers life, limb, or health, and ren-
ders cohabitation unsafe.' ,217 The court further found that
physical cruelty is to be determined on a case by case basis
21s
and that a single act of physical cruelty does not provide a
ground for divorce unless the act "'is so severe and atrocious as
to endanger life, or unless the act indicates an intention to do
serious bodily harm or causes reasonable apprehension of serious
danger in the future.' ,,219 The family court had held that the
wife's conduct of discharging the gun did not constitute physical
cruelty toward the husband because he did not sustain bodily
injury.
220
The court of appeals noted that no South Carolina case di-
rectly addressed whether it was necessary for a spouse to prove
214. Id. Later that morning the wife set fire to the house. She was hospitalized and
placed under psychiatric care. Id.
215. Id. at 321, 322 S.E.2d at 682.
216. Id. The court listed seven factors for the family court to consider when deter-
mining whether the wife was entitled to alimony or separate maintenance. Id. at 324-25,
322 S.E.2d at 684.
217. Id. at 322, 322 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 506, 56
S.E.2d 330, 333 (1949) (the husband's act of slapping the wife twice and pinching her was
not sufficient to sustain charge of physical cruelty because it was not atrocious)).
218. 283 S.C. at 322, 322 S.E.2d at 682. See Crowder v. Crowder, 246 S.C. 299, 143
S.E.2d 580 (1965)(wife's testimony that her husband kicked her in the stomach when she
was pregnant, hit her on several occasions, and tried to choke her was not sufficient
evidence for finding physical cruelty).
219. 283 S.C. at 322, 322 S.E.2d at 683 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 253 S.C. 350, 354,
170 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1969)(when the only proven act of physical cruelty was one instance
of the husband hitting the wife with a belt, the case was remanded to the lower court to
determine findings on this incident)).
220. 283 S.C. at 322, 322 S.E.2d at 683.
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that he or she suffered bodily injury when a divorce is sought on
the ground of physical cruelty.22 1 Case law, however, provided
that a court may consider both the nature of the act and its
physical effect on the other spouse.222 Thus, the court held that
"if the wrongful act involves actual violence directed by one
spouse at the other, "'bodily injury'" is not required to find
"'physical cruelty.' ,,223 Further, a single assault may constitute
a ground for divorce if the assault is life threatening or is indica-
tive of an intention to do serious bodily harm or if it raises a
reasonable fear of great bodily harm in the future.224
The court examined the facts in Gibson and declared that
the wife's discharge of the firearm constituted actual violence. It
was not clear, however, whether "the wife's single act of violence
actually endangered the husband's life or whether the act mani-
fested an intention on her part to cause the husband serious
bodily harm or constituted a reasonable basis for believing the
husband might later be seriously hurt. ' 225 Therefore, the case
was remanded to the family court, which had the benefit of the
findings of fact and had evaluated the parties' credibility regard-
ing the shooting incident.228
The court did not define how severe or atrocious the act of
violence must be before a divorce can be granted on the ground
of physical cruelty. Justice Shaw pointed out in a concurring and
221. Id. at 323, 322 S.E.2d at 683.
222. Id. See, e.g., Vickers v. Vickers, 255 S.C. 25, 176 S.E.2d 561 (1970)(wife's re-
fusal to engage in sexual relations was not physical cruelty because there was no personal
violence or physical treatment endangering husband's life); Brown v. Brown, 250 S.C.
114, 156 S.E.2d 641 (1967)(wife was not guilty of physical cruelty when she struck her
husband because he suffered only slight facial scratches and, being a hefty man, was not
put in fear for his safety.)
223. 283 S.C. at 323, 322 S.E.2d at 683.
224. Id. at 323, 322 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Gill v. Gill, 269 S.C. 337, 237 S.E.2d 382
(1977) (husband not granted a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty since he was not
afraid when his wife threatened him with a BB gun); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C.
372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970)(a single act of physical cruelty held so atrocious and severe as
to endanger life when wife, without provocation, shot husband at close range, and a bul-
let entered his chest); DeMott v. DeMott, 198 Va. 22, 92 S.E.2d 342 (1956)(a single inci-
dent of battery when husband threw wife against wall held not to be ground for
divorce)).
225. 283 S.C. at 324, 322 S.E.2d at 683.
226. Id., 322 S.E.2d at 683-84. Although the court of appeals has jurisdiction in a
divorce action to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the
evidence, the case was remanded because the record had "grown cold" and the family
court had the benefit of the findings of fact. Id.
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dissenting opinion that "the firing of a gun sixteen times by one
spouse toward another is sufficient to place the bravest of per-
sons in fear of his life. '227 It is possible, however, that the evi-
dence regarding the shooting incident was contested in family
court and the remand by the court of appeals was no reflection
on its opinion on the severity of the act.
Bonnie M. Weisman
XI. INHERITED PROPERTY Is NOT MARITAL PROPERTY
In Hussey v. Hussey228 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that "any property inherited by a spouse, and any property
acquired in exchange for such inherited property, is not 'prop-
erty of the marriage.' ",229 The court further held that "though
inherited property is not marital property subject to equitable
distribution, it may properly be considered as a factor in deter-
mining what constitutes an equitable division of the marital
property. '230 By adopting these rules, South Carolina joins other
equitable distribution states that generally exclude inherited
property from the parties' marital estate.2 31
The dispute in Hussey concerned the consideration of Mr.
Hussey's inheritances in the equitable distribution of the marital
property. In 1966, prior to the marriage, Mr. Hussey inherited
from his mother over $50,000 worth of stock. During the mar-
riage he inherited from his father a remainder interest in the
227. Id. at 326, 322 S.E.2d at 684.
228. 280 S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1984).
229. Id. at 422, 312 S.E.2d at 270. "Property of the marriage" is synonymous with
marital property, and equitable distribution has been limited impliedly to include the
following types of marital property: "business interests, the marital home and its fur-
nishings, stocks and a savings account, automobiles, a summer cottage, and life insurance
policies." Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights Upon Di-
vorce in South Carolina: An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. REv. 227, 244-
45 (1981)(citations omitted).
230. 280 S.C. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 271. Although this holding supported the trial
judge's decision on the issue of equitable distribution, the case was reversed and re-
manded for failure to comply with S.C. FAMmY CT. R. 27(C)(1976), requiring that findings
of fact and conclusions of law be set forth in the order. The court noted that the record
did not adequately reveal what part of the inherited property was separate property. 280
S.C. at 424, 312 S.E.2d at 271.
231. 280 S.C. at 422, 312 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Bailey v. Bailey, 250 Ga. 15, 295
S.E.2d 304 (1982); .BAxTER, MARrrAL PROPERTY § 41.8 (Supp. 1983)).
[Vol. 37
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/9
DOMESTIC LAW
corpus of a trust fund worth at least $130,000.232
In September 1979 Mr. Hussey sold the majority of the
stock and purchased ninety gold coins with the sale proceeds.
Subsequently, he purchased ten additional gold coins with the
same proceeds. In the interim between these purchases he
placed money from the sale of the stock in a joint account held
with Mrs. Hussey. Mr. Hussey's unsold stocks, however, were
kept separate from the joint property. All the gold coins, worth
approximately $84,150, were placed in a joint safety deposit
box. 23
3
The family court judge found that Mr. Hussey's inherited
property was not "property of the marriage" subject to equitable
distribution under section 14-21-1020 of the South Carolina
Code.23 4 Rather, the court concluded that the inheritances were
"a relevant consideration in effecting an equitable distribution
of the marital property. '235 The court of appeals agreed, yet re-
manded the case for further findings of fact by the trial court.
236
The characterization of inherited property as property
solely of the inheriting spouse or as marital property subject to
equitable distribution had not been determined previously in
this state. The court of appeals listed the following four reasons
to support its holding that inherited property of a spouse, or any
property acquired in exchange for inherited property, is not
232. 280 S.C. at 420, 312 S.E.2d at 269. Mr. Hussey's interest was to follow his step-
mother's life estate. Id. at 421, 312 S.E.2d at 269. The parties disagreed on whether or
not the remainder interest was vested. Brief of Respondent at 1; Brief of Appellant at 1.
On appeal the court noted that if the remainder was not vested it could not be consid-
ered in the marital property division. Id. at 425, 312 S.E.2d at 271.
233. Id. at 420-21, 312 S.E.2d at 269.
234. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (1976) was repealed in 1981 and replaced by the
following statute:
The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine
actions ... for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, separate support and mainte-
nance, legal separation, and in other marital litigation between the parties, and
for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the parties in such actions in
and to the real and personal property of the marriage . ., if requested by
either party in the pleadings.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(2)(1976).
235. 280 S.C. at 421, 312 S.E.2d at 269. Neither party contended that it was error
for the trial judge to exclude the inheritances from the marital property. Appellant, how-
ever, argued that once the trial court determined that his inheritance was not subject to
equitable distribution under § 14-21-1020, it should not have been considered at all.
Brief of Appellant at 2.
236. See supra note 230.
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"property of the marriage": (1) "tradition has long accorded the
inheriting spouse a separate and sole interest in that spouse's
inherited property";2 37 (2) "a substantial majority of states ex-
clude inherited property from the marital property of the par-
ties";2 38 (3) "the South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on spe-
cial equity principles, has established certain parameters within
which spousal property may be divided";239 and (4) "the inclu-
sion of inherited property in the marital estate subjects it to be-
ing removed from the natural line of succession, thus thwarting
the desire of the persons who acquired it and passed it on to the
spouse in possession. At the same time, the spouse who made no
contribution toward acquisition of the property benefits from
the windfall award."240 Since inherited property is not character-
ized as marital property, the court held that it is not subject to
equitable distribution pursuant to the statute.241
Despite its holding that inherited property is separate prop-
erty, the court nevertheless warned:
[I]n certain instances, where the nonmarital character of inher-
ited property is lost, it may be equitably divided. This may
occur when the property becomes so commingled as to be un-
traceable; is utilized by the parties in support of the marriage;
or is titled jointly or otherwise utilized in such manner as to
evidence an intent by the parties to make it marital
property. 2
42
237. 280 S.C. at 422, 312 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra
note 229, at 229-30).
238. 280 S.C. at 422, 312 S.E.2d at 270 (citing I BAXTER, supra note 231, § 41:8(c)
(detailing how various jurisdictions deal with the issue of inherited property and distri-
bution of the marital estate)).
239. 280 S.C. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Barden v. Barden, 278 S.C. 672, 301
S.E.2d 141 (1983)(title is not a significant determinant of whether property is marital or
nonmarital); Parrot v. Parrot, 278 S.C. 60, 292 S.E.2d 182 (1982)(not all property
brought into or acquired during the marriage by either party is marital property)). The
Hussey court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court "has implicitly held that
marital property is that property of the parties which arises from or to some extent is
augmented by the efforts of the marital parties." 280 S.C. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 270.
240. 280 S.C. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 270.
241. Id. For text of statute, see supra note 234.
242. 280 S.C. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 270. A leading case on commingled property is
Klingberg v. Klingberg, 68 III. App. 3d 513, 386 N.E.2d 517 (1979). In that case the
appellant had made several deposits of funds acquired prior to marriage into an account
held jointly with the respondent. In adjudicating the parties' claims to the funds upon
divorce, the court held that "the failure to properly segregate nonmarital property by
commingling it with marital property evinces an intent to have the former property
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In addition, the court held that inherited property, though
not marital property subject to equitable distribution, may be
considered as a factor in determining an equitable division of
the marital property.243 To support this holding, the court
quoted a South Carolina Supreme Court decision, "'it is always
proper for the [family court] judge to take into consideration the
debts of both of the parties as well as the properties of both of
the parties in decreeing equitable distribution.' -1244 The Hussey
court thus added inherited property to a judicially devised list of
criteria to be employed in determining the equitable division of
property.245 Although the husband argued that consideration of
his inherited property in the property division implicitly in-
cluded this property in the distribution,246 the court did not ad-
dress this contention, leaving distribution to the trial judge's
treated as part of the marital estate. Absent evidence to the contrary,. . . treating non-
marital property in this manner will result in its transmutation to marital property." Id.
at 516-17, 386 N.E.2d at 520 (citations omitted). Some authorities addressing the issue
have held that commingling of nonmarital with marital property creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of marital property. See Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo.
App. 1977); I. BAXTER, supra note 231, § 41:8(f). No such language was articulated here.
The Hussey court directed the trial court on remand to "examine whether placing the
proceeds from the sale of the inherited stock and the gold coins purchased with such
proceeds into a joint account transmuted the nomnarital property into marital prop-
erty." 280 S.C. at 424-25, 312 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, 275 S.C.
308, 270 S.E.2d 715 (1980)). Since the inherited stock, which was unsold, never became
marital property, the trial court could not order its transfer to the wife in lieu of cash in
an equitable division. 280 S.C. at 424, 312 S.E.2d at 271.
243. Id. at 423, 312 S.E.2d at 271.
244. 280 S.C. at 423-24, 312 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Levy v. Levy, 277 S.C. 576, 578,
291 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1982)). As further support for treating inherited property of one
spouse as a factor in determining an equitable property division, the court cited a line of
South Carolina cases holding that retirement pay, although not marital property subject
to equitable distribution, may properly be considered in determining the amount of ali-
mony. Id. at 424 n.2, 312 S.E.2d at 271 n.2 (citing Haynes v. Haynes, 279 S.C. 162, 303
S.E.2d 429 (1983); Carter v. Carter, 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982); Bugg v. Bugg,
277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982)). In Haynes the court found a "gross abuse of discre-
tion" in allowing the wife only $300 alimony per month, when the judge apparently
based the award solely on earnings and did not consider the husband's military retire-
ment pay. 279 S.C. at 164, 303 S.E.2d at 430.
245. These criteria include the following-, material contribution (direct or indirect)
to the acquisition of property; age, health, and physical condition of the parties; their
station in life; future earning capacities; contributions to the acquisition of marital prop-
erty; and conduct of the parties in bringing about the divorce. See Chastain, Henry &
Woodside, supra note 229, at 242-44.
246. Brief of Appellant at 2.
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discretion after consideration of each party's property.24 7
Finally, the court established the following three-step proce-
dure for determining equitable distribution on remand:
(1) ... determine the existence of and assign to each party his
or her non-marital property; (2) determine the value of each
item of marital property not already distributed; and (3) de-
cide how division of the net marital property can be made most
equitably, considering among other things, the debts and non-
marital properties of each of the parties, the contributions of
the parties, the effect of the award of alimony on the distribu-
tion and the effect, if any, marital fault is to have on the distri-
bution of the marital property.
24 8
Adoption of this three-step procedure aligns South Carolina
with other leading jurisdictions.
2 49
Hussey v. Hussey is a significant decision clearly setting
forth the proper classification and role of inherited property in
an equitable distribution. In holding that inherited property is
not marital property, Hussey should reassure spouses that their
separate inheritances will not be distributed automatically as
part of an equitable distribution. The court cautioned, however,
that spouses must keep their inherited property separate to pre-
vent its being characterized as marital property. In determining
that separate inheritances may be treated as a factor for consid-
eration in property divisions, the court followed previous deci-
247. 280 S.C. at 424, 312 S.E.2d at 271.
248. Id. (citations omitted). See also Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232, 320
A.2d 496, 503-04 (1974); Chastain, Henry & Woodside, supra note 229, at 244-45; Gros-
man, Identification and Valuation of Assets Subject to Equitable Distribution, 56
N.D.L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1980).
249. In Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 210, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974), the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted thirteen specific criteria to be considered. New York has
adopted ten specific criteria for consideration, and Pennsylvania has adopted ten rele-
vant factors to be considered. I. BAXTER, supra note 231, § 41:2(b). In Shaluly v. Shaluly,
284 S.C. 71, 325 S.E.2d 66 (1985), decided after Hussey, the South Carolina Supreme
Court gave the following list of thirteen criteria to be examined in an equitable distribu-
tion: (1) ages, earning capabilities, and background of the parties; (2) duration of the
marriage; (3) standard of living during the marriage; (4) money and property brought
into the marriage; (5) income; (6) property acquired during marriage; (7) source of acqui-
sition; (8) value and income-producing capacity of property; (9) debts and liabilities of
the parties; (10) mental and physical health of the parties; (11) earning potentials (pre-
sent and future); (12) effect of distribution on the ability to pay alimony; and (13) gifts
to each other. Id. at 75, 325 S.E.2d at 68 (quoting Painter, 65 N.J. at 210, 320 A.2d at
492 (1974)).
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sions allowing separate property to affect equitable distribution,
even though that property is not included in the distribution.
Finally, the court attempted to establish a three-part procedure
for trial courts to employ in deciding equitable distribution upon
divorce.
Anthony Todd Brown
XII. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION SUBJECT TO FEDERAL
STATUTE
In Marks v. Marks2 50 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980251 bound the South Carolina family court to enforce a West
Virginia child custody decree without modification. The court
also held that the family court should have refused to consider a
counterclaim for custody since the claimant had acted wrong-
fully in bringing the child to South Carolina in defiance of the
West Virginia custody decree.
The father in Marks removed the child from West Virginia
to South Carolina in violation of a West Virginia custody decree.
The mother, a West Virginia resident, sued in South Carolina
for enforcement of the West Virginia decree, and the father
counterclaimed for permanent custody of the child. The family
court awarded custody to the father based on changed circum-
stances. The mother appealed both the decree and her award of
five hundred dollars for attorney's fees.
The court of appeals ruled first that the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act preempted existing state law.25 2 The
court then observed that because West Virginia was the child's
home state when the mother initiated the original custody pro-
ceedings and West Virginia had jurisdiction in those proceedings
under its own state law,253 the federal act required the South
250. 281 S.C. 316, 315 S.E.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1984).
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
252. The court determined that the act preempted state law because it had become
effective on December 28, 1980, prior to the commencement of this action. See State ex
rel. Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981); Salisbury v. Salisbury, 657
S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. App. 1983).
253. Section 1738A(a) of the act provides: "The appropriate authorities of every
state shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify... any child custody
1985]
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Carolina courts to enforce the West Virginia decree without
modification. A South Carolina family court could not modify
the custody decree unless there were a showing that South Caro-
lina, rather than West Virginia, had jurisdiction to determine
custody.25 4 The West Virginia court had noted in the divorce
and custody decree that it would have continuing jurisdiction
over the parties and the action.255 Further, under West Virginia
law the state retained jurisdiction over a child who was removed
from the state.25 6 Consequently, the South Carolina family court
was bound to enforce the West Virginia decree without
modification.
The court also held that the family court, in modifying the
West Virginia decree, had abused its discretion and disregarded
common-law principles. The court of appeals noted that juris-
diction should not be granted "where a party seeking custody
attempts by his own wrongful act to wrest from a sister state a
jurisdiction properly appertaining to it. '257 The court also ob-
served that "where a change of custody is sought on the basis of
changed circumstances, the changed circumstances required by
the law cannot flow from the acts of a person who has improp-
erly or in violation of a valid custody decree of a sister state
removed the child to another jurisdiction. '258 The court con-
cluded that "absent an emergency situation relating to the wel-
determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
state." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)(1980). A determination is consistent with the federal act if
(1) the court determining child custody has jurisdiction under the laws of its state and
(2) that state is the home state of the child on the date the proceedings commence. 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i)(1980).
254. The South Carolina family court was prevented from modifying the West Vir-
ginia decree unless the conditions in subsection (f) of the federal act were satisfied. 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(a). Subsection (f) states:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if -
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1738(f)(1980).
255. 281 S.C. at 322, 315 S.E.2d at 158.
256. Id. See Acord v. Acord, 264 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1980). See also Smollar v.
Smollar, 276 S.C. 528, 280 S.E.2d 543 (1981).
257. 281 S.C. at 322, 315 S.E.2d at 161. The father brought the child to South Caro-
lina "in defiance of a custody decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in a sister
state." 281 S.C. at 323, 315 S.E.2d at 162.
258. 281 S.C. at 323, 315 S.E.2d at 161-62.
132 [Vol. 37
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/9
1985] DOMESTIC LAW
fare of the child and requiring its intervention, the family court
should not have exercised jurisdiction. 2 59 The evidence in this
case, the court found, did not support a claim that an emergency
existed.260 In addition, the father could have sought relief in the
West Virginia courts on the ground of changed conditions.261
Finally, the court addressed a claim by the mother that the
family court abused its discretion in awarding inadequate attor-
ney's fees. The court found that the trial judge made none of the
findings required by prior case law in awarding attorney's fees
26 2
and remanded the issue to the family court for
redetermination.63
The court's opinion is well-reasoned and thorough in its ex-
planation of applicable law. Practitioners should be aware, how-
ever, of a potential conflict between the policies of the federal
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 and the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act.264 The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act emphasizes the best interest of the child in determina-
tion of jurisdiction,265 while the federal act grants jurisdictional
priority to the child's home state.266 This distinction may re-
259 Id., 315 S.E.2d at 162.
260. The court of appeals noted:
Timothy may well have been unhappy with his mother in West Virginia, but
there is little to suggest he was in serious danger of immediate harm if he
remained with her. Since he passed the previous school year in her care and
custody without apparent incident, it is difficult to tell how much his unhappi-
ness during the summer vacation may have resulted from the persuasion and
influence of the father.
Id. at 324, 315 S.E.2d at 162.
261. Id. at 323, 315 S.E.2d at 162.
262. See Wood v. Wood, 269 S.C. 600, 239 S.E.2d 315 (1977); Nienow v. Nienow, 268
S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 279 S.C. 459, 309 S.E.2d 14 (Ct.
App. 1983). The Wood court identified the following factors to be considered in awarding
attorney's fees: "the nature, extent and difficulty of the services rendered; the time nec-
essarily devoted to the case; the professional standing of counsel; the contingency of the
compensation, and the beneficial results accomplished." 269 S.C. at 607, 239 S.E.2d at
317 (1977)(citing Smith v. Smith, 253 S.C. 350, 170 S.E.2d 650 (1969)).
263. 281 S.C. at 324-25, 315 S.E.2d at 162-63. The court of appeals directed the
family court on remand to make appropriate awards of attorney's fees and expenses pur-
suant to S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-140, 20-7-798(c)(1976). Id.
264. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (1976). The Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act became effective in July 1981.
265. See Id. § 20-7-788(a)(2).
266. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A). The federal act considers the best interest of
the child in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(2)(B), but this section applies only if no other state would
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A(2)(A)(1980).
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quire courts to reconsider the jurisdictional question. Since this
action, however, was commenced before the enactment of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and after the effective
date of the Kidnapping Prevention Act, the court based its deci-
sion in Marks on the federal act and preexisting case law.
Lisa S. Godwin
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